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Abstract
We define the independent natural extension of two local models for the general case of infinite
spaces, using both sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions. In contrast to Mi-
randa and Zaffalon (2015), we adopt Williams-coherence instead of Walley-coherence. We show
that our notion of independent natural extension always exists—whereas theirs does not—and that
it satisfies various convenient properties, including factorisation and external additivity.
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1. Introduction
When probabilities are imprecise, in the sense that they are only partially specified, it is no longer
clear what it means for two variables to be independent (Couso et al., 1999). One approach is to
apply the standard notion of independence to every element of some set of probability measures.
The alternative, called epistemic independence, is to define independence as mutual irrelevance, in
the sense that receiving information about one of the variables will not effect our uncertainty model
for the other. The advantage of this intuitive alternative is that it has a much wider scope: since
epistemic independence is expressed in terms of uncertainty models instead of probabilities, it can
easily be applied to a variety of such models, including non-probabilistic ones; we here consider
sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions.
When an assessment of epistemic independence is combined with local uncertainty models,
it leads to a unique corresponding joint uncertainty model that is called the independent natural
extension. If the variables involved can take only a finite number of values, this independent natural
extension always exists, and it then satisfies various convenient properties that allow for the design
of efficient algorithms (de Cooman et al., 2011; de Cooman and Miranda, 2012). If the variables
involved take values in an infinite set, the situation becomes more complicated. On the one hand,
for the specific case of lower probabilities, Vicig (2000) managed to obtain results that resemble the
finite case. On the other hand, for the more general case of lower previsions, Miranda and Zaffalon
(2015) recently found that the independent natural extension may not even exist.
Our present contribution generalises the results of Vicig (2000) to the case of conditional lower
previsions, using sets of desirable gambles as an intermediate step. The key technical difference
with Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) is that we use Williams-coherence instead of Walley-coherence.
This difference turns out to be crucial because our notion of independent natural extension always
exists. Furthermore, as we will see, it satisfies the same convenient properties that are known to
hold in the finite case, including factorisation and external additivity.
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Proofs are provided in the appendix of the arXiv version of this paper (De Bock, 2017), which
had to be omitted from the published version because of the page limit constraint.
2. Preliminaries and Notation
We use N to denote the natural numbers without zero and let N0 := N∪{0}. R is the set of real
numbers and Q is the set of rational numbers. Sign restrictions are imposed with subscripts. For
example, we let R>0 be the set of positive real numbers and let Q≥0 be the set of non-negative
rational numbers. The extended real numbers are denoted by R := R∪{−∞,+∞}.
For any non-empty set X , the power set of X—the set of all subsets of X—is denoted by
P(X ), and we let P /0(X ) :=P(X ) \ { /0} be the set of all non-empty subsets of X . Elements
of P(X ) are called events. A set of events B ⊆P(X ) is called a field if it is non-empty and
closed with respect to complements and finite intersections and unions. If it is also closed with
respect to countable intersections and unions, it is called a sigma field. A partition of X is a set
B ⊆P /0(X ) of pairwise disjoint non-empty subsets of X whose union is equal to X . We also
adopt the notational trick of identifying X with the set of atoms {{x} : x ∈X }, which allows us
to regardX as a partition ofX .
A bounded real-valued function on X will be called a gamble on X . The set of all gambles
onX is denoted by G (X ), the set of all non-negative gambles onX is denoted by G≥0(X ), and
we let G>0(X ) := G≥0(X ) \ {0} be the set of all non-negative non-zero gambles. For any set of
gambles A ⊆ G (X ), we let
posi(A ) :=
{
n
∑
i=1
λi fi : n ∈ N,λi ∈ R>0, fi ∈A
}
(1)
and
E (A ) := posi(A ∪G>0(X )) . (2)
Indicators are a particular type of gamble. For any A ∈P(X ), the corresponding indicator IA of A
is a gamble in G (X ), defined for all x ∈X by IA(x) := 1 if x ∈ A and IA(x) := 0 otherwise.
Finally, for any B ⊆P /0(X ), we will also require the notion of a non-negative B-measurable
gamble, which we define as a uniform limit of simpleB-measurable gambles.
Definition 1 Let B ⊆P /0(X ). We call g ∈ G≥0(X ) a simple B-measurable gamble if there are
c0 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ci ∈ R≥0 and Bi ∈B, such that g = c0+∑ni=1 ciIBi .
Definition 2 Let B ⊆P /0(X ). A gamble g ∈ G≥0(X ) is B-measurable if it is a uniform limit of
non-negative simpleB-measurable gambles, in the sense that there is a sequence {gn}n∈N of simple
B-measurable gambles in G≥0(X ) such that limn→+∞ sup |g−gn|= 0.
Readers that are familiar with the concepts of simple and measurable functions that are com-
mon in measure theory will observe some similarities. However, there are also some important
differences. On the one hand, our definitions are more restrictive: we only consider bounded non-
negative functions, Definition 1 requires that the coefficients ci are non-negative, and Definition 2
considers uniform limits instead of pointwise limits. On the other hand, our definitions are more
general because we allow for B to be any subset of P /0(X ). Nevertheless, if B∪{ /0} is a sigma
field, we have the following equivalence.
122
INDEPENDENT NATURAL EXTENSION FOR INFINITE SPACES: WILLIAMS-COHERENCE TO THE RESCUE
Proposition 3 Consider anyB ⊆P /0(X ) such thatB∗ :=B∪{ /0} is a sigma field. Then for any
g ∈ G≥0(X ), g isB∗-measurable in the measure-theoretic sense (Nielsen, 1997, Definition 10.1) if
and only if it isB-measurable in the sense of Definition 2.
The proof of this result is based on the following sufficient condition forB-measurability, which
provides a convenient tool for establishing theB-measurability of a given function. In particular, it
implies that every non-negative gamble isP /0(X )-measurable.
Proposition 4 Let B ⊆P /0(X ) and g ∈ G≥0(X ). If, for all r ∈ Q≥0, the set {x ∈X : g(x) ≥ r}
is a finite union of pairwise disjoint events inB∪{X , /0}, then g isB-measurable.
Corollary 5 Every g ∈ G≥0(X ) isP /0(X )-measurable.
3. Modelling Uncertainty
A subject’s uncertainty about a variable X that takes values x in some non-empty set X can be
mathematically represented in various ways. The most popular such method is perhaps probability
theory, but it is by no means the only one, nor is it the most general one. In order for our results to
have a broader scope, we here adopt the frameworks of sets of desirable gambles and conditional
lower previsions.
The main aim of this section is to provide an overview of the basic technical aspects of these
frameworks, as these will be essential to the rest of the paper. Notably, we do not impose any
constraints on the cardinality of X : it may be finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite.
Connections with other—perhaps better known—models for uncertainty, including probability the-
ory, will be discussed briefly at the end.
The basic idea behind sets of desirable gambles is to model a subject’s uncertainty about X by
considering his attitude towards gambles—bets—on X . In particular, we consider the gambles
f ∈ G (X ) that he finds desirable, in the sense that he is willing to engage in a transaction where,
once the actual value x ∈X of X is known, he will receive a—possibly negative—reward f (x) in
some linear utility scale. Even more so, he prefers these desirable gambles over the status quo, that
is, over not conducting any transaction at all. A set of desirable gambles is called coherent if it
satisfies the following rationality requirements.
Definition 6 A coherent set of desirable gambles D on X is a subset of G (X ) such that, for any
two gambles f ,g ∈ G (X ) and any non-negative real number λ ∈ R>0:
D1: if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0, then f ∈D;
D2: if f ∈D then λ f ∈D;
D3: if f ,g ∈D , then f +g ∈D;
D4: if f ≤ 0, then f /∈D .
Despite their simplicity, sets of desirable gambles offer a surprisingly powerful framework for mod-
elling uncertainty; see for example (Walley, 2000) and (Quaeghebeur, 2014). For our present pur-
poses though, all we need for now is Definition 6.
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Conditional lower previsions also model a subject’s uncertainty about X by considering his
attitude towards gambles on X . However, in this case, instead of considering sets of gambles, we
consider the prices at which a subject is willing to buy these gambles. Let
C (X ) := G (X )×P /0(X )
be the set of all pairs ( f ,B), where f is a gamble on X and B is a non-empty subset of X—an
event. A conditional lower prevision is then defined as follows.
Definition 7 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a map
P : C → R : ( f ,B)→ P( f |B).
For any ( f ,B) in the domain C , the lower prevision P( f |B) of f conditional on B is interpreted as
a subject’s supremum price µ for buying f , under the condition that the transaction is called off
when B does not happen—if x /∈ B. In other words, P( f |B) is the supremum value of µ for which
he is willing to engage in a transaction where he receives f (x)−µ if x ∈ B and zero otherwise, and
furthermore prefers this transaction to the status quo.
It is also possible to consider conditional upper previsions P( f |B), which are interpreted as
infimum selling prices. However, since selling f for µ is equivalent to buying − f for −µ , we have
that P( f |B) = −P(− f |B). For that reason, we will mainly focus on conditional lower previsions.
Unconditional lower previsions correspond to the special case where B =X for all ( f ,B) ∈ C ; we
then use the shorthand notation P( f ) := P( f |X ) and call P( f ) the lower prevision of f . Similarly,
we refer to P( f ) := P( f |X ) as the upper prevision of f .
Because of their interpretation in terms of buying prices for gambles, a particularly intuitive
way to obtain a conditional lower prevision P is to derive it from a set of gambles D . In particular,
for every D ⊆ G (X ), we let
PD( f |B) := sup{µ ∈ R : [ f −µ]IB ∈D} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (3)
A conditional lower prevision is then called coherent if can be derived from a coherent set of desir-
able gambles in this way.
Definition 8 A conditional lower prevision P on a domain C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if there is a
coherent set of desirable gambles D onX such that P coincides with PD on C .
This definition of coherence is heavily inspired by the work of Williams (1975, 2007). The
only two minor differences are that our rationality axioms on D are slightly different from his, and
that we do not impose any structure on the domain C . Nevertheless, when the domain C satisfies
the structural constraints in (Williams, 2007), Definition 8 is equivalent to that of Williams. More
generally, as the following result establishes, it is equivalent to the structure-free notion of Williams-
coherence that was developed by Pelessoni and Vicig (2009).
Proposition 9 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if and only if it is real-
valued and, for all n ∈ N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C :
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ 0, (4)
where we let B := ∪ni=0Bi.
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The advantage of this alternative characterisation is that it is expressed directly in terms of lower
previsions. Nevertheless, we consider Equation (4) to be less intuitive than Definition 8, which is
why we prefer the latter.
From a mathematical point of view, Definition 8 also has the advantage that it allows for simple
and elegant proofs of some well-known results. For example, it follows trivially from our definition
of coherence that the domain of a coherent conditional lower prevision can be arbitrarily extended
while preserving coherence, whereas deriving this result directly from Equation 4 is substantially
more involved; see for example the proof of (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009, Proposition 1). Further-
more, our definition also allows for a very natural derivation of the so-called natural extension of
P, that is, the most conservative extension of P to C (X ). In particular, instead of having to derive
this natural extension directly, Definition 8 allows us to rephrase this problem into a closely related
yet simpler question: what is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles D onX such that PD
coincides with P on C ? The answer turns out to be surprisingly simple.
Proposition 10 Consider a coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) and let
AP :=
{
[ f −µ]IB : ( f ,B) ∈ C ,µ < P( f |B)
}
and E (P) := E (AP). (5)
Then E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles onX and PE (P) coincides with P on C . Further-
more, for any other coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that PD coincides with P on
C , we have that E (P)⊆D .
Abstracting away some technical details, the reason why this result holds should be intuitively
clear. First, since conditional lower previsions are interpreted as called-off supremum buying prices,
we see that the gambles in AP should be desirable. Combined with D1–D3, the desirability of the
gambles in E (P) then follows.
Since smaller sets of desirable gambles lead to more conservative—pointwise smaller—lower
previsions, we conclude that the natural extension of P is given by
E( f |B) := PE (P)( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (6)
The following proposition provides a formal statement of this result.
Proposition 11 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆C (X ). Then E, as defined
by Equation (6), is the pointwise smallest coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X ) that
coincides with P on C .
All in all, we conclude that Definition 8 provides an intuitive as well as mathematically con-
venient characterisation of Williams-coherence that is furthermore equivalent to the structure-free
version of Pelessoni and Vicig (2009). From a technical point of view, this equivalence will not be
important further on, since all of our arguments will be based on the connection with sets of desirable
gambles. From a practical point of view though, this equivalence is highly important, because the
Williams-coherent conditional lower previsions that are considered in (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009)
are well-known to include as special cases a variety of other uncertainty models, including expecta-
tions, lower expectations, probabilities, lower probabilities and belief functions; lower probabilities,
for example, can be obtained by restricting the domain of P to indicators. For that reason, all of
our results can be immediately applied to these special cases as well. A detailed treatment of these
special cases, however, does not fit within the page constraints of this contribution, and therefore
falls beyond the scope our present work.
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4. Epistemic Independence
Having introduced our main tools for modelling uncertainty, the next step towards developing a
notion of independent natural extension is to agree on what we mean by independence. Within the
context of lower previsions, there are basically two main options.
The first approach, which we will not consider here, is to interpret lower previsions as lower
expectations, that is, as tight lower bounds on the expectations that correspond to some set of prob-
ability measures, and to then impose the usual notion of independence on each of the probability
measures in that set. This approach has the advantage of being familiar, but is restricted in scope
because it can only be applied to uncertainty models that are expressed in terms of probabilities.
The second approach, which is the one that we will adopt here, is to regard independence as
an assessment of mutual irrelevance. In particular, we say that X1 and X2 are independent if our
uncertainty model for X1 is not affected by conditioning on information about X2, and vice versa.
This definition can easily be applied to a probability measure, and then yields the usual notion of
independence. However, and that is what makes this approach powerful and intuitive, it can just
as easily be applied to lower previsions, sets of desirable gambles, or any other type of uncertainty
model. This type of independence is usually referred to as epistemic independence. The aim of
this section is to formalize this concept for the case of two variables, in terms of sets of desirable
gambles and conditional lower previsions.
Consider two variables X1 and X2 where, for every i ∈ {1,2}, Xi takes values xi in a non-empty
set Xi that may be uncountably infinite, and let X := (X1,X2) be the corresponding joint variable
that takes values x := (x1,x2) in X1×X2. In this context, whenever convenient, we will identify
B ∈P /0(X1) with B×X2 and B ∈P /0(X2) with X1×B. Similarly, for any i ∈ {1,2}, we will
identify f ∈ G (Xi) with its cylindrical extension to G (X1×X2), defined by
f (x1,x2) := f (xi) for all x = (x1,x2) ∈X1×X2.
In order to make this explicit, we will then often denote this cylindrical extension by f (Xi). In this
way, for example, for any f ∈ G (X2) and B∈P(X1), we can write f (X2)IB(X1) to denote a gamble
in G (X1×X2) whose value in (x1,x2) is equal to f (x2) if x1 ∈ B and equal to zero otherwise. Using
these conventions, for any set of gambles D onX1×X2, we define the marginal models
marg1(D) := { f ∈ G (X1) : f (X1) ∈D} and marg2(D) := { f ∈ G (X2) : f (X2) ∈D}
and, for any events B1 ∈P /0(X1) and B2 ∈P /0(X2), the conditional models
marg1(DcB2) := { f ∈ G (X1) : f (X1)IB2(X2) ∈D}
and
marg2(DcB1) := { f ∈ G (X2) : f (X2)IB1(X1) ∈D}.
Conditioning and marginalisation both preserve coherence: if D is a coherent set of desirable gam-
bles onX1×X2, then marg1(D) and marg1(DcB2) are coherent sets of desirable gambles onX1,
and marg2(D) and marg2(DcB1) are coherent sets of desirable gambles onX2.
That being said, let us now recall our informal definition of epistemic independence, which was
that the uncertainty model for X1 is not affected by conditioning on information about X2, and vice
versa. In the context of sets of desirable gambles, this can now be formalized as follows:
marg1(D |B2) = marg1(D) and marg2(D |B1) = marg2(D).
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The only thing that is left to specify are the conditioning events B1 and B2 for which we want this
condition to hold. We think that the most intuitive approach is to impose this for every B1 ∈P /0(X1)
and B2 ∈P /0(X2), and will call this epistemic subset-independence. However, this is not what is
usually done. The conventional approach, which we will refer to as epistemic value-independence,
is to focus on singleton events of the type B1 = {x1} and B2 = {x2}; see for example (Walley, 1991)
and (de Cooman and Miranda, 2012). We believe this conventional approach to be flawed and will
argue against it further on. Until then, we postpone this debate by adopting a very general approach
that subsumes the former two as special cases. In particular, for every i ∈ {1,2}, we simply fix
a generic set of conditioning events Bi ⊆P /0(Xi). Epistemic value-independence corresponds to
choosingBi =Xi, whereas epistemic subset-independence corresponds to choosingBi =P /0(Xi).
For sets of desirable gambles, this leads us to the following definition.
Definition 12 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles onX1×X2. Then D is epistemically
independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j}= {1,2}:
margi(DcB j) = margi(D) for all B j ∈B j.
For coherent lower previsions, as a prerequisite for defining epistemic independence, we require
that the domain C ⊆ C (X1×X2) is independent, by which we mean that for any i and j such that
{i, j}= {1,2}, any pair ( fi,Bi) ∈ C (Xi) and any event B j ∈B j:
( fi,Bi) ∈ C ⇔ ( fi,Bi∩B j) ∈ C . (7)
Other than that, we impose no restrictions on C ; its elements ( f ,B) ∈ C are for example not re-
stricted to the types that appear in Equation (7). As a result, the following definition of epistemic
independence is applicable beyond the context of lower previsions. For example, by restricting the
domain to indicators, we obtain a notion of epistemic independence that applies to conditional lower
probabilities. A detailed discussion of these special cases, however, is left as future work.
Definition 13 Let C ⊆ C (X1×X2) be an independent domain. A coherent conditional lower
prevision P on C is then epistemically independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j}= {1,2}:
P( fi|Bi) = P( fi|Bi∩B j) for all ( fi,Bi) ∈ C and B j ∈B j.
Another important feature of this definition is that B j is not only irrelevant to unconditional local
lower previsions of the form P( fi)—in the sense that P( fi) = P( fi|B j)—but also to conditional
local lower previsions such as P( fi|Bi)—in the sense that P( fi|Bi) = P( fi|Bi ∩B j). This type of
irrelevance is called h-irrelevance; see Cozman (2013) and De Bock (2015). Note, however, that
this feature is optional within our framework; it only appears whenC is sufficiently large. If Bi =Xi
for all ( fi,Bi) ∈ C , our definition reduces to the simple requirement that P( fi) = P( fi|B j).
5. The Independent Natural Extension
All of that being said, we are now finally ready to introduce our central object of interest, which
is the independent natural extension. Basically, the question to which this concept provides an
answer is always the same: given two local uncertainty models and an assessment of epistemic
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independence, what then should be the corresponding joint model? The answer, however, depends
on the specific framework that is being considered.
Within the framework of sets of desirable gambles, the local uncertainty models are coherent
sets of desirable gambles. In particular, for each i ∈ {1,2}, we are given a coherent set of desirable
gambles Di on Xi. The aim is to combine these local models with an assessment of epistemic
independence to obtain a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X1×X2. The first requirement
on D , therefore, is that it should have D1 and D2 as its marginals, in the sense that margi(D) =Di
for all i ∈ {1,2}. The second is that D should be epistemically independent. If both requirements
are met, D is called an independent product of D1 and D2. The most conservative among these
independent products is called the independent natural extension.
Definition 14 An independent product of D1 and D2 is an epistemically independent coherent set
of desirable gambles D onX1×X2 that has D1 and D2 as its marginals.
Definition 15 The independent natural extension ofD1 andD2 is the smallest independent product
of D1 and D2.
If all we know is thatD is epistemically independent and hasD1 andD2 as its marginal models,
then the safest choice for D—the only choice that does not require any additional assessments—is
their independent natural extension, provided of course that it exists. In order to show that it always
does, we let
D1⊗D2 := E (A1→2∪A2→1) , (8)
with
A1→2 := { f2(X2)IB1(X1) : f2 ∈D2,B1 ∈B1∪{X1}} (9)
and
A2→1 := { f1(X1)IB2(X2) : f1 ∈D1,B2 ∈B2∪{X2}} . (10)
The following result establishes that D1⊗D2 is the independent natural extension of D1 and D2.
Theorem 16 D1⊗D2 is the independent natural extension of D1 and D2.
Similar concepts can be defined for conditional lower previsions as well. In that case, the local
uncertainty models are coherent conditional lower previsions. In particular, for every i ∈ {1,2}, we
are given a coherent conditional lower prevision Pi on some freely chosen local domainCi⊆C (Xi).
The aim is now to construct an epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision P
on C ⊆ C (X1×X2) that has P1 and P2 as its marginals, in the sense that P coincides with P1 and
P2 on their local domain: P( fi|Bi) = Pi( fi|Bi) for all i ∈ {1,2} and ( fi,Bi) ∈ Ci. As before, a model
that meets these criteria is then called an independent product, and the most conservative among
them is called the independent natural extension. Clearly, in order for these notions to make sense,
the global domain C must at least include the local domains C1 and C2 and must furthermore be
independent in the sense of Equation (7). The definitions and results below take this for granted.
Definition 17 An independent product of P1 and P2 is an epistemically independent coherent con-
ditional lower prevision on C that has P1 and P2 as its marginals.
Definition 18 The independent natural extension of P1 and P2 is the point-wise smallest indepen-
dent product of P1 and P2.
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Here too, if all we know is that P is epistemically independent and has P1 and P2 as its
marginal models, then the safest choice for P—the only choice that does not require any addi-
tional assessments—is the independent natural extension, provided that it exists. The following
result establishes that it does, by showing that it is a restriction of the operator P1⊗P2, defined by
(P1⊗P2)( f |B) := PD( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X1×X2), with D = E (P1)⊗E (P2). (11)
Theorem 19 The independent natural extension of P1 and P2 is the restriction of P1⊗P2 to C .
Interestingly, as can be seen from this result, the choice of the joint domain C does not affect the
resulting independent natural extension, in the sense that any C that includes ( f ,B) will lead to the
same value of (P1⊗P2)( f |B). For that reason, we will henceforth assume without loss of generality
that C = C (X1×X2).
6. On the Choice of Conditioning Events
The fact that the existence results in the previous section are valid regardless of the choice of B1
and B2 should not be taken to mean that this choice does not affect the model. In some cases, it
most definitely does. In the remainder of this contribution, we will study the extend to which it
does, and how it affects the properties of the resulting notion of independent natural extension.
As a first observation, we note that larger sets of conditioning events correspond to stronger
assessments of epistemic independence, and therefore lead to more informative joint models. For
example, as can be seen from Equations (8)–(10), adding events to B1 and B2 leads to a larger—
more informative—set of desirable gamblesD1⊗D2. Similarly, as can be seen from Equation (11),
it leads to a joint lower prevision that is higher—and therefore again more informative. There is
one important exception to this observation though, which occurs when we add conditioning events
that are a finite disjoint union of other conditioning events. In that case, the resulting notion of
independent natural extension does not change.
Proposition 20 For each i ∈ {1,2}, letB′i be a superset ofBi that consists of finite disjoint unions
of events inBi. ReplacingB1 byB′1 andB2 byB
′
2 then has no effect on the resulting independent
natural extension D1⊗D2 or P1⊗P2.
As a particular case of this result, it follows that ifBi is a finite partition ofXi, we can replace
it by the generated algebra—minus the empty event. As an even more particular case, if X1 and
X2 are finite, we find that epistemic value- and subset-independence lead to the same notion of
independent natural extension. For that reason, in the finite case, it does not really matter which of
these two types of epistemic independence is adopted.
In the infinite case though, the difference does matter, and the debate between epistemic value-
and subset-independence remains open. For lower previsions, Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) recently
adopted epistemic value-independence in combination with Walley-coherence. Unfortunately, they
found that the corresponding notion of independent natural extension does not always exist. They
also considered the combination of epistemic value-independence with Williams-coherence, and
argued that the resulting model was too weak. For the case of lower probabilities, Vicig (2000)
adopted epistemic subset-independence in combination with Williams-coherence, showed that the
corresponding independent natural extension always exists, and proved that it satisfies factorisation
properties. Our results so far can be regarded as a generalisation of the existence results of Vicig
(2000). As we are about to show, his factorisation results can be generalised as well.
129
DE BOCK
7. Factorisation and External Additivity
When X1 and X2 are finite, the independent natural extension of two lower previsions P1 and P2
is well-known to satisfy the properties of factorisation and external additivity (de Cooman et al.,
2011). Factorisation, on the one hand, states that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = P1(gP2(h)) =
{
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h)≥ 0
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h)≤ 0,
(12)
where g is a non-negative gamble onX1, h is a gamble onX2 and P1(g) :=−P1(−g). By symmetry,
the role of 1 and 2 can of course be reversed. External additivity, on the other hand, states that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = P1( f )+P2(h) (13)
where f and h are gambles onX1 andX2, respectively.
Compared to the properties that are satisfied by the joint expectation of a product measure of
two precise probability measures, these notions of factorisation and external additivity are rather
weak. For example, for a precise product measure, additivity is not ‘external’, in the sense that f
and h do not have to be defined on separate variables, nor does factorisation require g to be non-
negative. Nevertheless, even in this weaker form, these properties remain of crucial practical im-
portance. For example, in the context of credal networks—Bayesian networks whose local models
are imprecise—they turned out to be the key to the development of efficient inference algorithms;
see for example de Cooman et al. (2010), De Bock and de Cooman (2014) and De Bock (2015).
Any notion of independent natural extension that aims to extend such algorithms to infinite spaces,
therefore, should preserve some suitable version of Equations (12) and (13).
The aim of this section is to study the extent to which these equations are satisfied by the notion
of independent natural extension that was developed in this paper. As we will see, the answer ends
up being surprisingly positive.
For all i ∈ {1,2}, let Pi be a coherent conditional lower prevision on Ci ⊆ C (Xi), let E i be its
natural extension to C (Xi), and let Bi be a subset of P /0(Xi). The independent natural extension
of P1 and P2 then satisfies the following three properties, the first of which implies the other two as
special cases.
Theorem 21 Let {i, j}= {1,2}. For any f ∈ G (Xi), h ∈ G (X j) andBi-measurable g ∈ G≥0(Xi),
we then have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E i
(
f +gE j(h)
)
.
Corollary 22 (Factorisation) Let {i, j}= {1,2}. For any h ∈ G (X j) and any g ∈ G≥0(Xi) that is
Bi-measurable, we then have that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = E i
(
gE j(h)
)
=
{
E i(g)E j(h) if E j(h)≥ 0;
E i(g)E j(h) if E j(h)≤ 0.
Corollary 23 (External additivity) For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2), we have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = E1( f )+E2(h).
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In each of these results, if the local domains C1 and C2 are sufficiently large—that is, if they include
the gambles that appear in the statement of the results—it follows from Proposition 11 that E i and
E j can be replaced by Pi and P j, respectively, and similarly for E i and Pi.
That being said, let us now go back to the question of whether or not Equations (12) and (13)
can be generalised to the case of infinite spaces. For the case of external additivity, it clearly follows
from Corollary 23 that the answer is fully positive. Furthermore, this conclusion holds regardless
of our choice for B1 and B2; they can even be empty. For factorisation, the answer does depend
on B1 and B2. If we adopt epistemic subset-independence—that is, if we choose B1 =P /0(X1)
and B2 =P /0(X2)—it follows from Corollaries 5 and 22 that the answer is again fully positive,
becauseP /0(Xi)-measurability then holds trivially. IfB1∪{ /0} andB2∪{ /0} are sigma fields, the
answer remains fairly positive as well, because Proposition 3 then implies that it suffices for g to be
measurable in the usual, measure-theoretic sense. If we adopt epistemic value-independence—that
is, if we choose B1 =X1 and B2 =X2—it is necessary for g to be Xi-measurable, which is a
rather strong requirement that easily fails. For that reason, we think that for the case of infinite
spaces, when it comes to choosing between epistemic value- and subset-independence, the latter
should be preferred over the former.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
The main conclusion of this work is that by combining Williams-coherence with epistemic subset-
independence, we obtain a notion of independent natural extension that always exists, and that fur-
thermore satisfies factorisation and external additivity. For weaker types of epistemic independence,
including epistemic value-independence, the existence result and the external additivity property re-
main valid, but factorisation then requires measurability conditions.
We foresee several lines of future research. The first, which we expect to be rather straightfor-
ward, is to extend our results from the case of two variables to that of any finite number of variables.
Next, these extended versions of our results could then be used to develop efficient algorithms for
credal networks whose variables take values in infinite spaces, by suitably adapting existing algo-
rithms for the finite case. On the more technical side, it would be useful to see whether our results
can be extended to the case of unbounded functions. Finally, for variables that take values in Eu-
clidean space,B1 andB2 could be restricted to the Lebesgue measurable events. Combined with an
assessment of continuity, we think that this could lead to the development of a notion of independent
natural extension that includes sigma additive product measures as a special case.
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